How Much?
Will the anticipated rise take place? Evidence from other leading indicators clouds the view. Starting with data pointing to a smaller rise, net new orders for machinery and equipment for the six-month period September 1969 through February 1970 were only 6 percent higher than in the corresponding period a year earlier; for December through Februlary the increase was only 2 percent above the corresponding year-earlier period., With the value of contracts for commercial and industrial construction included, orders and contracts together were about 8 percent above their year-earlier levels, for both the December-February and the SeptemberFebruary comparisons. On the exceptionally bullish side, new capital appropriations by the 1,000 largest manufacturing firms during the fourth quarter of 1969 exceeded those in the fourth quarter of 1968 by more than 13 percent; a comparison of the last halves of these two years shows a 16 percent gain. However, it should be noted that in times of tight money the share of investment carried out by the biggest corporations tends to be larger than usual, presumably because smaller firms feel the effect of capital rationing most strongly.
Some evidence may be gained from considering the revisions of the anticipations that have been measured several times. After adjustment by the Office of Business Economics, the survey taken in late October and November projected annual rates of $81.0 billion for the first quarter of 1970 and $82.93 billion for the second quarter. In the January-February survey the projections are scaled down to $80.0 billion and $81.78 billion, respectively. Furthermore, in the interval between the November-December and January-February surveys, reported plans for 1970 declined by about 1 percent.
It would certainly be dangerous to try to project these small cutbacks as a trend, and to say that current plans will not be realized because of further cutbacks. Nevertheless, the anticipations data should not be taken as revealed truth. While the forecasting record of the series is quite good, the average absolute error for the year-long projections made in January and February is 3.1 percent. Furthermore, the adjusted anticipations have been above the realizations for all of the past four years, by small amounts in 
How Can We Explain 1969?
Although, as noted above, the planned increases for 1970 seem to be supported by other estimates, and although the larger rises in 1969 are already on record, there remains the problem of explaining why investment spending has been so strong in the face of a weakening economy. With the warning that these preliminary figures may be revised substantially before they become "final," this question must nevertheless be approached. Simple but popular models of investment spending based on either the "cash flow" or the "accelerator" view of investment are examined below and found to shed little light on the problem, but more sophisticated models also produce substantial errors.
Using quarterly data covering 1953-68, I have estimated the quantitative relationship between capital expenditures from the OBE-SEC survey (in current dollars) and lagged corporate cash flow (profits after taxes plus depreciation charges). The "best" results are achieved by making investment dependent on cash flow in the previous six quarters with nearly all of the weight in the previous four quarters.2 The standard error of estimate, $864 million, is impressively small, but the errors go in runs: Once the equation gets off the track, it tends to produce errors of the same sign and nearly the same magnitude in succeeding periods. 3 It seems clear that something important is missing from the model. When the equation is extrapolated into 1969, even using the information contained in the residual for the fourth quarter of 1968, the predictions are very poor. As summarized in Table 1 , the errors rise to more than $5 billion in the last half of 1969, and the percentage error for the whole year exceeds 5 percent. In view of the decline in after-tax profits during the third and fourth quarters of 1969, which led to declines in cash flow, projecting this model ahead to 1970 would almost surely produce inferior results, barring a large (and at this point totally unforeseen) rebound in profits.
As a second simple model I have specified deflated plant and equipment expenditures to be a function of lagged real output (measured by the gross product of private nonfarm business). This may be thought of as a generalized accelerator model.4 As before, the fit in the sample period is very 2. An Almon distributed lag procedure was used and the best results were found by experimenting with the length of the lag.
3. The estimation procedure includes the assumption of first order correlation and thus the estimation is carried out essentially on first differences of the variables. The high serial correlation coefficient of 0.94 indicates the presence of extreme autocorrelation in the errors.
4. The Almon distributed lag procedure is used. The results are not at all sensitive to the number of lagged otutput terms included, but the best fit is achieved with thirteen. Once more the errors are highly autocorrelated, with the first order serial correlation coefficient again being 0.94. Nor do more sophisticated models, which take more factors into account, hold the key. As an example, I present some results from a pair of equations explaining expenditures on producers' durable equipment, the largest component of nonresidential business fixed investment. This equation takes account of, among other things, the relative price of equipment, the colporate tax rate, accelerated depreciation, the investment tax credit, and capital costs as measured by both the yield on stocks and an approximation to the real interest rate.5 The two equations first predict orders for equipment and then predict expenditures based on orders. The fit during 5. The equation involves a rather complicated lag structure and possibly controversial specification of the variables. the sample period is not quite as impressive as that of the other models, but there is much less serial correlation. The results of estimating the equations through 1968 and then extrapolating forward into 1969 may be found in Table 2 What other factors could be built in? Perhaps the current inflationary episode has radically changed the way in which businessmell form their expectations. This is something that is very difficult to measure. Perhaps wage increases deserve a more direct role than they have in the fancier model, where they enter only indirectly as an element inducing capitallabor substitution, that is, through the real interest rate variable. No allowance is made for the sort of expectations that might lead, for example, to hurried construction of a plant to avoid higher construction costs later on. There is no mechanism to allow for the possibility that expansion plans put off in 1967 or 1968 in hopes of lower interest rates could no longer be postponed. Perhaps capacity is more fully utilized than current measures indicate; better indices might be very useful. Perhaps disaggregation would reveal something that the aggregate analysis hides.
The search for ad hoc explanations could go on and on. But it will stop here for now.
Discussion
CHARLES BISCHOFF POINTED OUT in summarizing his report that capacity utilization was not included as a variable in any of the equations he had studied. However, several participants noted that including measures of capacity utilization could not have helped to explain the large increase in investment in 1969, since the indices of operating rates were quite low.
Lawrence Klein said that disaggregating the investment by sectors helps to reveal a more understandable pattern. Much of the special strength of investment in 1969-70 is in the area of utilities and communications. Capacity in these industries had fallen behind the need and this investment represents a catching up. In manufacturing, however, investment is not out of line with equations based on past experience. Only in the commercial sector is investment surprisingly high, and it is probably being affected by the outlook for future costs and prices.
George Terborgh pointed out that 1970 is the sixth year of an investment boom, as measured by the capital expenditures of nonfinancial corporations relative to their gross colporate product and by the ratio of capital expenditures to internal funds. He commented: "The first four years of this boom can be rationalized fairly well by the enormous increase in private employment that occurred in that period. But 1969 and 1970 cannot be fully explained in this way. They probably reflect, in addition to the effect of growth in employment, the expectation of rapidly rising labor costs and attempts to avoid higher c-osts for equipment and construction in the future."
Along the same line, Alan Greenspan pointed out that long-term expectations of more rapid rises in wage rates increase the rate of return on replacement of existing facilities. There was general agreement that expectations of future wage increases enhance the incentives to invest currently, implying a substitution of capital for labor. Bischoff noted that this effect should have been picked up by the real rate of interest variable.
Paul Samuelson suggested that few businesses that had invested more than the equations said they "should" had reason to be sorry. Inflation has bailed out "wrong decisions." Daniel Brill commented that profits began to fall off late in 1969. This may make some businessmen sorry and lead to downward revisions of current plans.
